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Summary
This paper examines the model of multi-jurisdictional for-
mation considered by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Le
Breton and Weber (2003), where the distribution of individ-
uals is given by Lebesgue measure over a bounded interval.
Every jurisdiction chooses a location of a public good and
shares its cost of production among its residents. In ad-
dition, each individual incurs a transportation cost. We
consider a notion of secession-proof allocation where no
group of individuals can make all its members better off
by choosing both a location of the public good and a cost-
sharing mechanism among its own members. We examine
secession-proof allocations and show that they may fail to
satisfy some desirable requirements, including the Rawlsian
principle. We show however that secession-proofness can
be reconciled with an approximate Rawlsian principle in
large societies.
∗. Université de Toulouse I, GREMAQ and IDEI, Toulouse, France.
∗∗. CORE, Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, and Department of Economics, Southern
Methodist University, Dallas, USA.
∗∗∗. CORE. The analysis conducted in this paper elaborates on Drèze, Le Breton and Weber (2006)
who explore the limit case of an unbounded society.
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Résumé
Cet article examine un modèle décrivant un environnement
où une population hétérogène d’individus est répartie entre
plusieurs juridictions. Dans la lignée des articles d’Alesina
et Spolaore (1997) et Le Breton et Weber (2003), l’hétéro-
généité est unidimensionnelle (localisation de l’individu) et
sa distribution est décrite par la mesure de Lebesgue sur un
intervalle de la droite réelle. Chaque juridiction choisit la
localisation d’un équipement public et distribue son coût
financier entre ses membres. Chaque individu acquitte par
ailleurs un coût d’accès personnel (de transport) pour béné-
ficier du bien. Nous étudions les structures de juridictions
et les allocations de coûts qui sont robustes à la sécession
dans le sens où le coût agrégé supporté par toute coalition
possible d’individus est inférieur au coût le plus petit que
cette coalition supporterait pour produire le même service si
elle était isolée. Nous montrons que ce principe de stabilité
entre en conflit avec d’autres exigences, au premier rang
desquelles le principe de Rawls. Il est cependant démontré
que dès l’instant où la société est de grande taille, une ré-
conciliation est possible si l’on se contente d’une version
affaiblie de ce principe.
Keywords: Optimal jurisdictions, secession-proofness, Rawlsian
allocations, efficiency.
Mots clés : Juridictions de taille optimale, stabilité à la menace de
sécession, allocations rawlsiennes, efficacité.
J.E.L. : D70, H20, H73.
1. Introduction
In this paper we consider a large heterogeneous society whose members make
selections from the given policy space. The selection may consist of a unique
policy wherein the society remains undivided. However, if more than one policy
is chosen, it creates a partition of the entire society into smaller subsocieties;
called hereafter jurisdictions, each one associated with a chosen policy. The basic
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reason for a possible partition of the society into smaller groups is the conflict
between increasing returns to scale on one hand, and heterogeneity of agents’
preferences on the other. Indeed, in a large group the per capita contributions
towards financing of a public project could be lower than in a smaller group.
However, the policy choices made by a large group could be quite distant from
the ideal choices of some of its members. Thus, the benefits of group size are not
unlimited, and the increasing returns could be outweighed by costs of heterogeneity
of agents’ characteristics and tastes. It is possible, therefore, that a decentralized
organization might be superior to the grand coalition that embraces the entire
society.
The policy choices of the society and the composition of the formed jurisdictions
do not provide a complete description of the problem we consider. Since the policies
are costly in our framework, one has to identify a mechanism of sharing the costs
within each jurisdiction. Thus, when a set of appropriate policies has been chosen
and a partition of individuals has formed, the cost allocation among individuals
must be determined. When all three elements of the collective choice problem
(namely projects’ choice, assignment to the projects, and cost allocation) are in
place, one can turn to a stability test of the proposed arrangement. There could
be a single individual or a group of individuals (not necessarily from the same
jurisdiction) who object to the proposed arrangement. The rejection is credible
if there is a policy with concomitant allocation of its costs among the members
of the deviating group that would make each of them better off with respect
to the original arrangement. This group therefore poses a threat of “secession.”
Hence, the set of cost allocations that do not permit credible rejections is called
“secession-proof.” Accordingly, the main focus of this paper is analysis of existence
and characterization of the set of secession-proof cost allocations.
We examine a society of individuals who make policy choices from the unidi-
mensional policy space. The cost of each policy is given by the positive parameter
g. The preferences of each individual are single-peaked and symmetric with respect
to her peak, which represents her favorite policy choice. The heterogeneity of
individuals’ preferences is described by the distribution of the peaks over the
real line. Alesina and Spolaore (1997) study this problem in the case where the
distribution λ is the Lebesgue measure over the unit interval. In their framework,
the only cost allocation available for each jurisdiction is the equal-share, when
all individuals within the same jurisdiction make an identical contribution to-
wards the policy costs. Le Breton and Weber (2003) examine a class of absolutely
continuous distributions, and demonstrate the existence of secession-proof cost
allocations for high values of policy costs g that make it optimal to form a single
jurisdiction. They establish a principle of partial equalization asserting that, in
general, secession-proofness entails some, but not full, compensation of citizens
disadvantaged by the assigned public policy. In particular, it could be the case
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that both equal-share allocation (no equalization) and Rawlsian allocation (full
equalization) are not secession-proof. Haimanko, Le Breton and Weber (2004)
consider an arbitrary probability measure with bounded support, and establish
the existence of secession-proof cost allocations regardless of the value of policy
costs g.
In this paper we consider distributions of individuals’ ideal points by the
Lebesgue measure on the large bounded interval [–θ,θ]. We examine the crucial
role played under these circumstances by the Rawlsian principle under which the
society maximizes the utility level of the most disadvantaged individual. In our
framework, the Rawlsian principle implies the full equalization of all individuals’
utilities, and, therefore, entails the full compensation to every individual for being
assigned to the policy different from her favored one.
The implications of the Rawlsian principle in the society where the population
is distributed over the entire real line, i.e. θ =∞, have been studied by Drèze, Le
Breton and Weber (2006). Their main result asserts that the unique secession-proof
allocation is, in fact, Rawlsian, and the only mechanism to guarantee stability in
this setting societies is the full equalization of utilities of all individuals. In this
paper, we show that this result cannot be extended to societies whose population
distribution has a finite support, i.e., θ < ∞, and the Rawlsian principle and
secession-proofness are, in general, inconsistent. In an attempt to bridge the chasm
between two requirements, we relax the Rawlsian principle by considering instead
a mild “privilege-free” condition that rules out granting excessive “privileges” to
some individuals, and, hence, imposes the additional cost burden of public policies
on the rest of the society. However, even this mild requirement, which holds for
all Rawlsian allocations, is shown to be incompatible with secession-proofness.
We then introduce the notion of approximate Rawlsian allocation, where the
proportion of individuals receiving a privilege of the given magnitude (relative to
the Rawlsian allocation), is sufficiently small. We show that in large finite societies
the approximate Rawlsian principle is consistent with secession-proofness.
We also examine the basic differences between the multi-jurisdictional and
one-jurisdictional settings. In particular, we show that the single-jurisdictional
version of the Le Breton and Weber (2003) result, which yields the existence of
secession-proof cost allocations that satisfy the principle of partial equalization,
does not always hold in the multi-jurisdictional framework.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model and
analyze the efficient partitions of the entire society. In Section 3 we introduce the
notion of a cost allocation, the principle of partial equalization, and define intra-
and inter-jurisdictional symmetric and Rawlsian allocations. In Section 4, we
introduce the notion of secession-proofness and show that the Rawlsian principle
and secession-proofness are, in general, incompatible. In Section 5 we demonstrate
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that even a relaxation of the Rawlsian principle does not reconcile it with secession-
proofness. We show, however, that in a large finite society, secession-proofness
yields cost allocations that satisfy the approximate Rawlsian principle. The proofs
of all results are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The Model and Efficient Partitions
We consider a group of individuals and the set of feasible policies represented
by the real line ℜ. Every individual has an ideal policy in ℜ and her preferences
over policies are single-peaked and symmetric with respect to the ideal point. This
allows us to identify an individual with her ideal point and to represent the society
by the distribution of individuals’ ideal points, which is given by the Lebesgue
measure λ over the interval Rθ = [–θ,θ], where θ is a positive real number. The
group choice consists of three elements:
• A partition of Rθ into measurable subsets with positive measure, called jurisdic-
tions;
• A policy in Rθ for each jurisdiction;
• A cost-sharing scheme among individuals, where the sum of individual contri-
butions covers the total cost of public projects.
For illustrative purposes, we may interpret this problem as follows: an urban
population located on the all real line is faced with a selection of a number and
location of public projects (say, libraries), an assignment of each individual to one
of the projects, and, finally, an allocation of projects costs to society members. We
assume that the cost of every project is a positive number g. We therefore adopt a
spatial interpretation of Rθ, where a policy choice is represented by the location of
the public project. That allows us to introduce the disutility or transportation cost
incurred by individuals. An individual located in t (labelled t henceforth) faces
the transportation cost d(t,p) between t and the location p of the public project
she is assigned to. We assume that transportation cost is simply represented by the
distance, i.e., d(t,p) = |t –p|.
For any bounded measurable subset S ⊂ℜ, denote by
D(S) = inf
p∈I
∫
S
d(t,p)dt,
the minimal aggregate transportation cost of the individuals in S. It is useful to
make the following observation:
Remark 2.1 – Every jurisdiction S would minimize its total transportation cost
by choosing the location of the public project at the ideal point of its “median
voter". That is, the median of S, denoted m(S), is the cost-minimizing location
économiepublique
201
recherches Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber, Jacques Drèze
for S. Thus, if the group S is an interval of length s, its total transportation cost
D(S) is given by ∫
S
| t –m(S) | dt = s
2
4
. (1)
At this point we do not examine how the monetary contribution of each
individual t towards the cost of the public projects is determined. The only
condition we require is the balanced budget that requires the society to finance all
chosen public projects.
Since the total cost incurred by jurisdiction S consists of policy and transporta-
tion components, the average cost of an individual t in S is
g+D(S)
λ(S)
.
The following remark, which plays an important role in our analysis, determines
the optimal size of a jurisdiction that minimizes the per capita cost of its members:
Remark 2.2 – If a jurisdiction is represented by an interval of length s, by (1),
the per capita total cost of its members is
f (s) ≡ s
4
+
g
s
.
For a given value of g > 0, the function s
4
+
g
s
is convex and obtains its minimum
at s∗ = 2
√
g. Therefore, the value of s∗ can be viewed as an optimal size of a
jurisdiction, and an interval of length s∗ as an optimal jurisdiction.
For every measurable subset S of Rθ denote by PS the set of all finite partitions
of the set S into measurable subsets with positive measure. If S = Rθ, we will simply
write P.
Definition 2.1 – The partition P ∈ P is efficient if for every partition P′, we
have ∑
S∈P′
[D(S+g] ≤
∑
S∈P′
[D(S) +g].
An efficient partition simply minimizes the aggregate sum of transportation
and policy costs over all partitions in P. The main result of this section guarantees
that, in general, there is a unique efficient jurisdictional structure which consists
of jurisdictions of equal size.
Proposition 2.1 – For every θ, every efficient partition consists of intervals of
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equal size. Moreover, the optimal number 1 of jurisdictions N (Rθ) is given by
2
N (Rθ) =

⌊ 2θ
s∗ ⌋ if 2θs∗ ≤
√
⌊ 2θ
s∗ ⌋(⌊ 2θs∗ ⌋+1)
⌊ 2θ
s∗ ⌋+1 if 2θs∗ ≥
√
⌊ 2θ
s∗ ⌋(⌊ 2θs∗ ⌋+1).
The size of each jurisdiction in an efficient partition is s(Rθ) =
2θ
N (Rθ)
.
Remark 2.3 – It would be useful to expand the notion of an optimal number
of jurisdictions to an interval of the arbitrary length L and to consider an efficient
partition of such an interval into N (L) equal size intervals. As in Proposition 2.1,
we have:
N (L) =

⌊ L
s∗ ⌋ if Ls∗ ≤
√
⌊ L
s∗ ⌋(⌊ Ls∗ ⌋+1)
⌊ L
s∗ ⌋+1 if Ls∗ ≥
√
⌊ L
s∗ ⌋(⌊ Ls∗ ⌋+1).
The optimal number of jurisdictions N (Rθ) is determined through the interplay
of two opposite forces. The creation of a new jurisdiction reduces the aggregate
transportation cost but adds an additional cost of public project g. Once we
determine that all jurisdictions are intervals of the same length, one can formulate
the problem in terms of minimization of the total aggregate cost with respect to
the length s of a typical jurisdiction. In general, the optimal value s∗ is such that
2θ
s∗ is not an integer and to find the minimum in this case, we take advantage
of convexity of the total aggregate cost as a function of s. After deriving the
unconstrained minimum s∗ of the total aggregate cost with respect to s, it remains
to examine the nearest value(s) of s on the right and on the left of s∗ for which the
value 2θ
s
is an integer. An evaluation of the total aggregate cost in these two points
yields the optimal number of jurisdictions. In the (non generic) case where these
two values of s yield the same cost, there are two optimal jurisdictional structures
with a different number of jurisdictions.
The “connectedness” of all optimal jurisdictions is a general property that can
be derived under more general assumptions on the individual transportation cost
functions and on the distribution of individuals over Rθ. However, the fact that
these intervals are of equal length, is driven by our assumption of the uniform
distribution of the population over Rθ. In the next proposition we evaluate the
optimal length of jurisdictions s(L) for an interval of size L and the average
1. In the expression, ⌊ 2θs∗ ⌋ denotes the largest integer (called integer part) that does not exceed 2θs∗ .
2. Obviously, if ⌊ 2θs∗ ⌋ = 0, then N (Rθ) = 1.
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individual contribution in an optimal partition:
Proposition 2.2 – For all positive values L we have:
(i) 2
√
g–
4g
L+2
√
g
≤ s(L) ≤ 2√g+ 4g
L–2
√
g
,
(ii) f (s(L)) ≤ f (2√g) + 27
√
g3
L2
.
3. Cost Allocations
Let us introduce the notion of a cost allocation that determines a monetary
contribution of each individual towards the cost of public projects in group S.
Definition 3.1 – A measurable function x, defined on the bounded subset S
is called an S-cost allocation 3 if it satisfies the budget constraint, i.e., the total
contribution of all members of S, x(S), is equal to the cost of the public project:
x(S) ≡
∫
S
x(t)dt = g.
We allow for lump sum transfers and do not restrict the mechanism for reallocation
of benefits within each potential jurisdiction S.
Definition 3.2 – A measurable function x defined on Rθ is called a P-cost
allocation if it satisfies the aggregate budget constraint:∑
S∈P
(x(S) –g) = 0. (2)
The results of the previous section show that efficiency leads to a well-defined
jurisdictional structure, whose aggregate policy cost is to be shared among all
individuals. In this section, we introduce a set of normative principles that
will impose some constraints on the choice of cost allocations. These principles
formulate various fairness requirements, including the Rawlsian principle and its
modifications.
We now define intra-jurisdictional symmetry and the principle of partial equal-
ization of cost allocations (the latter is introduced in Le Breton and Weber, 2003).
3. We use the term cost allocation without qualification when S = Rθ represents the entire population.
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Let S be an arbitrary jurisdiction and x an S-cost allocation.
Definition 3.3 Intra-Jurisdictional Symmetry – x satisfies intra-jurisdictional
symmetry if x(t) = x(s) whenever d(t,m(S)) = d(s,m(S)).
Definition 3.4 Partial Equalization – x satisfies the principle of partial equal-
ization if
(i) 0 ≤ x(t) –x(s) ≤ t – s for all t,s ∈ S such that s < t ≤m(S)
(ii) 0 ≤ x(t) –x(s) ≤ s– t for all t,s ∈ S such that s > t ≥m(S).
Since a project supported by group S is located at its median m(S), the intra-
jurisdictional symmetry requires that individuals who are equidistant from the
location of the public project should make an equal contribution. The principle of
partial equalization suggests some form of compensation within every jurisdiction.
Precisely, those closer to the project location contribute more than those who are
further away. But these contribution differentials cannot exceed the transportation
cost differentials and ultimately those closer to the project location would still
have a (weakly) lower aggregate cost.
If the principle of partial equalization is replaced by full equalization, the
appropriate cost allocation would equalize the total of transportation costs and
contribution towards the cost of public project for all members of S. This alloca-
tion is called Rawlsian as it minimizes the highest total cost burden among all
individuals in S:
Definition 3.5 Full Equalization (Rawlsian allocation) – An S-cost allocation
x is called Rawlsian if it yields the full equalization, i.e.,
x(t) –x(s) = t – s for all t,s ∈ S such that s < t ≤m(S) and
x(t) –x(s) = s– t for all t,s ∈ S such that s > t ≥m(S).
The Rawlsian allocation will be denoted xS
R
.
The location of the public project in S at the jurisdiction’s median m(S) implies
that the total individual contribution of citizen t in S is given by the term d(t,m(S))+
x(t). Since the aggregate transportation and policy costs in S combine to D(S) +g,
it follows that
xSR(t) =
g+D(S)
λ(S)
–d(t,m(S)).
Note that if S ⊂ Rθ is a connected interval [a,b], the allocation x
satisfies intra-jurisdictional symmetry if x(t) = x(b+a– t) for all t ∈ S;
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satisfies the principle of partial equalization if two conditions hold
0 ≤ x(t) –x(s) ≤ t – s for all pairs s, t such that a ≤ s ≤ t ≤ a+b
2
,
0 ≤ x(t) –x(s) ≤ s– t for all pairs s, t such that b ≥ s ≥ t ≥ a+ b
2
;
is Rawlsian if
x(t) = xSR(t) =

t +
g
b–a
– b–a
4
if t ∈
[
a, a+b
2
]
–t +
g
b–a
+ 3(b–a)
4
if t ∈
[
a+b
2
,b
]
.
The notions of intra-jurisdictional symmetry, partial equalization and Rawlsian
allocation are extended to a multi-jurisdictional set-up as follows. Consider a
pair (P,x), where P is a partition of Rθ and x is a P-cost allocation. x is intra-
jurisdictionally symmetric (respectively, Rawlsian or satisfies the principle of partial
equalization) if its truncation to S is intra-jurisdictionally symmetric (respectively,
Rawlsian or satisfies the principle of partial equalization) for every S ∈ P. We shall
denote by xP
R
the Rawlsian allocation associated with the partition P. It should
be noted that these principles do not impose any link between cost allocations in
different jurisdictions and do not restrict the sharing of the total public projects
costs Ng across N jurisdictions. Since x is a P-cost allocation, by (2), we have∑
S∈P
x(S) = gN ,
and if x(S) , g for some S, then a cross subsidization takes place. If x(S) < g, then
the jurisdiction S receives a subsidy to cover the cost of its public project, and if
x(S) > g, the jurisdiction S is a donor that subsidizes other jurisdictions.
To introduce the last principle of this section, we limit our attention to the case
where, as for efficient jurisdictional structures, the partition P consists of intervals
of equal length. Since all jurisdictions are of the same size, from a normative
point of view it makes sense to rule out a subsidization across jurisdictions and
to require that cost allocations should be the same in all jurisdictions. Indeed, an
external impartial observer contemplating that problem could argue that if we
promote the use of x in a given jurisdiction, then x should be promoted in all other
jurisdictions identical to that under consideration.
Definition 3.6 – Let P be a partition of Rθ into n jurisdictions. A P-cost
allocation x satisfies inter-jurisdictional symmetry if the equality
x(t +
2nθ
N
) = x(t)
holds for all t ∈ Rθ for which the point t + 2nθN also belongs to Rθ.
Intra and inter jurisdictional symmetry and partial equalization are general
normative principles which are useful to guide a selection of the cost allocation.
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The set of cost allocations satisfying the three properties is nonempty, as it always
contains the Rawlsian allocation. Given that the Rawlsian allocation meets several
desirable fairness criteria, the natural question in our analysis of stability is whether
the Rawlsian principle is compatible with the requirement of secession-proofness.
The next section provides a negative answer to this question. We show, moreover,
that even if the set of acceptable cost allocations is expanded to include all intra
and inter symmetric cost allocations satisfying the principle of partial equalization,
we still fall short of the reconciliation of our fairness requirements with the
secession-proofness.
4. Secession-Proofness
and the Rawlsian Principle
We now turn to the examination of “stable” partitions that are immune against
a threat of deviation or secession by a group of individuals. We study a collective
choice problem whose solution must be accepted by all individuals and all coali-
tions of individuals. That is, we require a voluntary participation of the individuals
in potentially seceding groups. This necessitates an examination of mechanisms
that allocate benefits among individuals in such a way that no coalition can
generate a higher payoff to all its members. However, if a coalition S can make its
members better off relative to the current arrangement, we will say that S is prone
to secession. Formally,
Definition 4.1 – Consider a pair (P,x), where P is a partition in P and x is a
cost allocation. The jurisdiction S is prone to secession (given (P,x)) if∫
S
(d(t,m(S)) +x(t))dt >D(S) +g.
If no jurisdiction is prone to secession, then the pair (P,x) is called secession-proof;
if there is no ambiguity we drop the first argument of the pair and simply refer to
a secession-proof cost allocation.
The concept of secession-proofness introduced here is closely related to the
notion of the core of a game with coalition structures (Aumann and Drèze (1974)),
whose set of players is Rθ, and the set of feasible outcomes of a coalition S is given
by all S-cost allocations. Since we do not use the game-theoretical analysis here,
we chose to formulate our results without relying on it.
We would like to point out two immediate but nevertheless useful implications
of secession-proofness:
Remark 4.1 – (i) Every jurisdiction balances its budget. Indeed, no jurisdiction
can be a net donor, since, otherwise it would secede and save the amount of the net
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transfer. No jurisdiction can be a net recipient either, as by (2), another jurisdiction
would have to be a net donor.
(ii) Every individual makes a nonnegative contribution to the financing of
the public project in her jurisdiction; otherwise, the coalition of other individuals
within that jurisdiction who do make a positive contribution would be better off
by breaking away from the jurisdiction.
As we argued above, the condition of secession-proofness is quite demanding
as it requires that no coalition should be able to deviate and thereby improve the
welfare of all its members. In this section we explore the extent to which this
principle can coexist with the normative principles introduced in the previous
section.
For a society Rθ denote by P(θ) an efficient partition of Rθ into N (θ) jurisdictions
of equal size and by xθ
R
the Rawlsian allocation associated with partition Pθ. Given
the cost of public project g, denote by SP(θ,g) the set of secession-proof cost
allocations, the nonemptiness of which is guaranteed by Haimanko, Le Breton
and Weber (2004). First, we describe the cases for which the Rawlsian principle is
compatible with the stability requirement of secession-proofness and show that, in
general, it is not the case:
Proposition 4.1 – Let θ ≥ √g. The pair (Pθ,xθR) is secession-proof if and only if
the ratio θ√
g
is an integer. 4
The natural question then arises is whether the secession-proofness is com-
patible with a weaker set of requirements than the Rawlsian principle. Indeed,
in the single-jurisdiction case Le Breton and Weber (2003) show that secession-
proofness is compatible with intra-jurisdictional symmetry and the principle of
partial equalization for a large class of the population distributions containing the
Lebesgue measure. In the multi-jurisdictional set-up, the situation becomes more
complicated. Unlike in the single-jurisdictional case, we have to face all additional
constraints of preventing secession by groups containing individuals from different
jurisdictions. Indeed we show that, even under inter-jurisdictional symmetry, the
aforementioned compatibility does not hold any longer. Denote by PES(θ,g) the set
of inter- and intra-symmetric cost allocations that satisfy the principle of partial
equalization. Note that this set contains the Rawlsian allocation and is, therefore,
nonempty. We have:
Proposition 4.2 – If N (Rθ) > 1, SP(θ,g)∩PES(θ,g) , ∅ if and only if the ratio
θ√
g
is an integer.
4. This is reminiscent of the integer problem examined first by Pauly (1967), (1970) in the context
of the theory of clubs. The Rawlsian allocation is secession-proof only for a non-generic subset of
values θ.
no 17 - 2005 / 2
208
Secession-Proofness in Large Heterogeneous Societies
In the next section we consider modified versions of the Rawlsian principle and
examine their compatibility with the stability requirement of secession-proofness.
5. Modifications of the Rawlsian Principle
and Secession-Proofness
In the previous section we have shown that it is in general impossible to recon-
cile the standard Rawlsian principle with the secession-proofness principle. When
the requirement of secession-proofness is maintained, it is therefore important to
investigate possible modifications of the Rawlsian principle.
By Proposition 2.1, an optimal partition of the bounded society Rθ consists of
N (Rθ) intervals of the equal size s(Rθ). Remark 2.2 implies that the lower bound on
the average cost within each jurisdiction in the partition is
√
g. It can be attained
only if every jurisdiction has the optimal size 2
√
g. The latter, however, is possible
only if θ is a multiple of
√
g. Thus, in general, the society will have to incur a per
capita cost larger than
√
g. We impose a mild condition on cost allocations by
requiring that no individual t ∈ Rθ is assigned a cost contribution, that, combined
with her transportation cost, would be less than
√
g. This condition rules out
cost allocation that grant privileges to some individuals and shift a higher cost
burden to the rest of the society. Unless one wishes to provide an individual or
a group with specific privileges, it is hard to offer a priori reason, immune to an
ethical or normative appraisal, to grant an individual a cost contribution below
the reservation payoff
√
g. Note the latter is attained only when the economies of
scale generated by a large jurisdiction are perfectly balanced by the heterogeneity
costs incurred by its size. The application of the ‘privilege-free” condition to all
subsets S of the society Rθ amounts to the following inequality:∫
S
(x(t) +d(t,m(S(t))))dt ≥ λ((S)√g. (3)
In fact, we will require (3) to hold only for intervals of the optimal size s∗:
Definition 5.1 – A cost allocation x is “privilege-free” if the inequalities (3)
are satisfied for all groups S ⊆ Rθ such that S = [t, t + s∗].
Obviously every Rawlsian allocation is privilege-free whenever θ is a multiple
of
√
g.
We shall show now that the privilege-free principle is, in general, incompatible
with secession-proofness in the multi-jurisdictional framework (or when
√
g < θ) if
the continuity of cost allocations is imposed:
Proposition 5.1 – Let
√
g ≤ θ. Then the set of continuous, secession-proof and
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privilege-free allocations on Rθ is nonempty if and only if θ is a multiple of
√
g.
Let θ ≥ √g. Since the inequality
∫ z+2√g
z
(x(t) +d(t,m(S(t))))dt ≤ 2g
is satisfied for every secession-proof allocation x and all z ∈
[
–θ,θ–2
√
g
]
, the
inequality (3) implies that ∫
S
(x(t) +d(t,m(S(t))))dt = 2g (4)
for all optimal jurisdictions S. 5 The equations (4) guarantee that the total cost
x(t) +d(t,m(S(t))) is a periodic function with the period of 2
√
g.
In order to reconcile a version of the Rawlsian principle with secession-
proofness, we examine an “approximate” Rawlsian principle and demonstrate
that for large populations with a bounded support, secession-proof cost alloca-
tions 6 are in some sense not “too far” from the Rawlsian solution. We formalize a
notion of privilege granted to a group of individuals when each of its members
contributes less than the amount prescribed by the Rawlsian allocation reduced by
some given value δ.
Definition 5.2 – Let δ > 0 be given. Let P be an efficient partition of Rθ. We
say that a P-cost allocation grants a privilege of magnitude δ to the group S (with
respect to the Rawlsian allocation xθ
R
) if for all t ∈ S the following inequality holds:
x(t) ≤ xθR(t) –δ.
We denote by G(x,δ,θ) the family of measurable sets S that are granted a privilege
δ via allocation x.
The main result of this section shows that if a society is large enough then the
size of a coalition receiving a privilege of the given magnitude via secession-proof
allocation is relatively small:
Proposition 5.2 – Let δ > 0 and a bounded set S ⊂ ℜ be given. Then there
exists θ¯ with S ⊂ Rθ such that for every θ > θ¯ and every secession-proof allocation
x ∈ SP(θ,g),
S <G(x,δ,θ).
5. Note that if θ <
√
g, the society Rθ does not contain optimal groups and the equations (4) are
vacuous.
6. The structure of the set of secession-proof cost allocations is rather intricate. From Proposition
5.2., we know that in general some individuals are going to incur a total cost smaller than
√
g. We
have derived some very preliminary insights on this set but a full understanding of the implications of
secession-proofness is currently out of reach.
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Proposition 5.2 asserts that if x is secession-proof, then for any privilege level,
the size of the privileged group must be small if the size of the entire population is
large enough. In some sense, Proposition 5.2 is a formal statement of the claim
that secession-proofness implies the approximate Rawlsian recommendation.
The assertion of Proposition 5.2 can actually be strengthened. Let us denote by
G′(x,δ,θ) the collection of groups S such that∫
S
(x(t)+ | t –m(S(t)) |)dt ≤
∫
S
(
x∗R(t)+ | t –m(S(t)) |
)
dt –δλ(S),
where the privilege δλ(S) is granted to the entire set S. The average benefit of
members of S is δ which is a weaker requirement than insisting on the privilege
level of δ for every member of S. Obviously,
G(x,δ) ⊆G′(x,δ).
We have a stronger version of Proposition 5.2:
Proposition 5.3 – Let δ > 0 and a bounded set S ∈ ℜ be given. Then there
exists θ¯ with S ⊂ Rθ such that for every θ > θ¯ and every secession-proof allocation
x ∈ SP(θ,g),
S <G′(x,δ,θ).
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A. Appendix
We start by stating several claims.
Claim A.1 Let P be an efficient partition. Then SP(t) ∈ argminS∈P | t –m(S) |.
That is, every individual is assigned to the public project closest to her location.
Follows immediately from efficiency of P.
Claim A.2 Let P be an efficient partition. Then every element S ∈ P is an
interval.
Proof: Consider S ∈ P and a,b ∈ S with m(S) ≤ a < b. We claim that every point
c ∈ [a,b] belongs to S. Indeed, suppose that such an c is assigned to another juris-
diction, say, S′. First note that m(S) ,m(S′). Otherwise, the merger of jurisdictions
S and S′ would violate the efficiency of P. Claim A.1 implies that m(S′) >m(S), but
the inequality | c–m(S′) |≤| c–m(S) | yields | b–m(S′) |<| b–m(S) |. Thus, b is closer
to m(S′) than to m(S), a contradiction to Claim A.1. 
Claim A.3 Let P be an efficient partition. Then all intervals S in P have the
same length.
Proof: Let S and S′ be two adjacent intervals in P and let l and l′ denote their
respective lengths. Since P is efficient, D(S) +D(S′) is minimal among all possible
partitions of S∪S′ into two intervals. Thus, (1) implies that l2 + (l′)2 ≤ x2 + y2 for
all nonnegative numbers x,y satisfying x + y = l+ l′. Since under the constraint
x+y = l+ l′ the convex function x2+y2 reaches its minimum at x = y = l+l
′
2
, it follows
that l must be equal to l′. 
Proof of Proposition 2.1: We prove here a version of proposition 2.1 by
considering an interval S of the length L rather than the set Rθ. Let N (L) be the
efficient number of jurisdictions when the population is distributed over S. Let
L = 2m
√
g+r, where m = ⌊ L
2
√
g
⌋, is an integer and 0 ≤ r < 2√g. We consider the case
where m > 0 (otherwise, N (L) is trivially equal to 1).
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When S is divided in N intervals of equal size, the total aggregate cost is
N
(
g+
L2
4N2
)
=Ng+
L2
4N
The first order condition over the set of real numbers yields
g–
L2
4N2
= 0,or
N ′ =
L
2
√
g
=
2m
√
g+ r
2
√
g
=m+
r
2
√
g
.
Since Ng+ L
2
4N
is convex in N , and N ′ is not necessarily an integer, it follows that
N (L) is either m or m+1. The optimal choice is m if and only if
gm+
L2
4m
≤ g(m+1)+ L
2
4(m+1)
,
which, after simplifications, is equivalent to
L2
4g
≤m(m+1), or L
s∗
≤
√
m(m+1).

Proof of Proposition 2.2: (i) Let L = 2m
√
g+ r, where m = ⌊ L
2
√
g
⌋ is an integer
and 0 < r < 2
√
g. By Proposition 2.1, the optimal number of intervals is either m or
m+1. This implies that s(L) is either equal to L
m
or to L
m+1
. Thus,
2m
√
g+ r
m+1
≤ s(L) ≤ 2m
√
g+ r
m
,
and, therefore,
2
√
g
r –2
√
g
L– r +2
√
g
≤ r –2
√
g
m+1
≤ s(L) – 2√g ≤ r
m
= 2
√
g
r
L– r
.
Since 0 < r < 2
√
g, this implies
2
√
g–
4g
L+2
√
g
≤ s(L) ≤ 2√g+ 4g
L–2
√
g
.
(ii) The per capita aggregate cost of an individual in an interval of length s:
f (s) =
1
s
(g+
s2
4
).
We evaluate the values f (s(L)) when L tends to infinity. By assertion (i), the value of
s(L) for large L is close to 2
√
g, and we examine the second order Taylor expansion
of f at 2
√
g. Assertion (i) implies that there is
z(L) ∈
[
2
√
g–
4g
L+2
√
g
,2
√
g+
4g
L–2
√
g
,
]
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such that
f (s(L)) – f (2
√
g) = f ′′(z(L))
(s(L) – 2
√
g)2
2
=
g(s(L) – 2
√
g)2
z(L)3
.
Since f ′′′(s) = – 6g
s4
< 0, the last inequality yields
f (s(L)) – f (2
√
g) ≤
16g3( 1
L–2
√
g
)2
8
√
g3( L
L+2
√
g
)3
. (5)
If L > 4
√
g then L
L+2
√
g
> 2
3
and 1
L–2
√
g
< 2
L
, yielding
f (s(L)) – f (2
√
g) ≤ 27
√
g3
L2
.
If L ≤ 4√g then s(L) is either 1 or 2, and f (s(L) is either g
L
+ L
4
or
2g
L
+ L
8
. It is easy to
verify that (5) holds in this case as well. 
Proof of Proposition 4.1: Assume first that θ
s∗ is an integer. Then the size of
each jurisdiction in an optimal partition is s∗ and the total cost incurred by an
individual t ∈ Rθ under allocation x∗R is
√
g.
Consider a jurisdiction S. By Remark 2.1, the total cost incurred by S is at least
g+ (λ(S))
2
4
and each t ∈ S on average contributes at least
f (λ(S)) =
g
λ(S)
+
λ(S)
4
.
Since the minimum of the function
g
s
+ s
4
is attained at s = 2
√
g, it follows that
g
λ(S)
+ λ(S)
4
≥ √g, and the coalition S is not prone to secession. Thus, the sufficiency
part is completed.
Assume now that the value θ√
g
exceeds 1 and is not an integer. Suppose that
the Rawlsian allocation xθ
R
is secession-proof. The efficiency implies that the total
cost incurred by the entire society Rθ is
2θ
[
gN (Rθ)
2θ
+
θ
2N (Rθ)
]
.
Then
λ(S)
[
gN (Rθ)
2θ
+
θ
2N (Rθ)
]
≤ g+ λ(S)
2
4
for all S. Since f (λ(S)) =
g
λ(S)
+ λ(S)
4
is minimal for at 2
√
g, which does not exceed 2θ,
the secession-proofness of xθ
R
implies that
gN (Rθ)
2θ
+
θ
2N (Rθ)
≤ √g.
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But this inequality is violated whenever N (Rθ) ,
θ√
g
, a contradiction. Thus, the
Rawlsian allocation is not secession-proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Let θ√
g
be an integer. By Proposition 4.1, the set
SP(θ,g) contains the Rawlsian allocation, which is, as we observed earlier, is an
element of PES(θ,g). Thus, the intersection of the sets SP(θ,g) and PES(θ,g) is
non-empty.
Assume now that θ√
g
is not an integer and let x be a cost allocation in PES(θ,g).
By Proposition 2.1, there are two possibilities.
If N = ⌊ θ√
g
⌋, then the size s = s(Rθ) of a jurisdiction in P is larger than 2√g.
Since there are at least two jurisdictions, consider the jurisdictions S1 ≡ [–θ,–θ+ s],
S2 ≡ [–θ+ s,–θ+2s]. Take an optimal group S∗ = [–θ+ s– √g,–θ+ s+ √g]. Since x
satisfies intra and interjurisdictional symmetry we have∫
S∗
(x(t) +d(t,m(S(t)))dt = 2
∫ –θ+s
–θ+s–
√
g
(x(t) +d(t,m(S(t)))dt. (6)
Moreover, the principle of partial equalization and the fact that s > 2
√
g imply
∫ –θ+s
–θ+s–
√
g
(x(t) +d(t,m(S(t)))dt
√
g
≥ 2
s
∫ –θ+s
–θ+ s
2
(x(t)+ | t –m(S1) |)dt. (7)
Since ∫ –θ+s
–θ+ s
2
(x(t)+ | t –m(S1) |)dt = g
2
+
s2
8
>
s
√
g
2
. (8)
By combining (6)-(8), we obtain∫
S∗
(x(t) +d(t,m(S(t)))dt > 2g.
However, the jurisdiction S∗ is optimal and, therefore,
g+D(S∗) =
∫ –θ+s+√g
–θ+s–
√
g
(| t + θ– s |)dt = 2g.
Thus, x is not secession-proof.
Consider now the case where N (Rθ) = ⌊ θ√g ⌋+ 1. The optimal size s = s(Rθ) is
smaller than 2
√
g. However, it is still bounded from below, namely,
s >
4
3
√
g. (9)
Indeed, since
N (Rθ) <
θ√
g
+1,
économiepublique
215
recherches Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber, Jacques Drèze
it follows that
s > 2
√
g
θ
θ+
√
g
.
If θ ≥ 2√g, (9) follows immediately. If θ < 2√g then N (Rθ) = ⌊ θ√g ⌋+1 = 2. Since a
two-jurisdictional structure yields a lower aggregate cost than the grand coalition,
by Remark 2.1, we have
2(g+
θ2
4
) ≤ g+ (2θ)
2
4
,
or θ >
√
2g. Since s = θ and
√
2 > 4
3
it follows that (9) holds in this case as well.
Consider the coalition S′ ≡
[
–θ,–θ+2
√
g
]
. Since s , 2
√
g, it follows
∫ –θ+s
–θ
(x(t)+ | t –m(S′) |)dt > s√g.
Note that (9) implies 2
√
g < 3s
2
, that is, the point –θ+2
√
g is located to the left of
the median of the adjacent jurisdiction –θ+ 3
2
s. The principle of partial equalization
implies ∫ –θ+2√g
–θ+s
(x(t)+ | t –m(S′) |)dt > (2√g– s)√g,
which leads to ∫ –θ+2√g
–θ
(x(t)+ | t –m(S) |)dt > 2g.
However, the equality g+D(S′) = 2g implies that x is not secession-proof. 
Proof of Proposition 5.1: It remains to show that if N (Rθ) > 1 and θ is not a
multiple of
√
g, then any continuous secession proof allocation is not privilege-free.
Suppose, in negation, that there is a continuous secession-proof privilege-free
allocation x.
Since 2θ is not a multiple of 2
√
g, Remark 2.2 implies that there exists t¯ ∈ (–θ,θ)
such that
x(t¯) +d(t¯,m(S(t¯))) >
√
g.
Consider first the case where θ > 2
√
g. Then there exists δ¯ > 0 such that for every
positive δ < δ¯ either the coalition
[
t¯ –δ, t¯ +2
√
g
]
or the coalition
[
t¯ –2
√
g, t¯ +δ
]
is a
subset of Rθ. Without loss of generality, assume that the latter holds and denote
S(δ) =
[
t¯ –2
√
g, t¯ +δ
]
. By (1) of Remark 2.1, we have
g+D(S(δ)) = 2g+δ
√
g+
δ2
4
. (10)
Since x is continuous, there exists 0 < δ′ < δ¯ and η > 0 small enough such that
x(t) +d(t,m(S(t))) >
√
g+η
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for all t ∈ [t¯, t¯ +δ′]. Furthermore, since x is privilege-free, for every δ,0 < δ < δ′, we
have ∫
S(δ)
(x(t) +d(t,m(S(t))))dt > 2g+δ
√
g+ηδ. (11)
Then the secession proofness of x implies that the equation (10) and the inequality
(11) are incompatible for sufficiently small values of δ, a contradiction.
Consider the case where θ < 2
√
g. Since N (Rθ) > 1, Proposition 2.1. yields
that N (Rθ) = 2 and θ >
√
g. If there exists t ∈
[
–θ,θ–2
√
g
)
∪
(
2
√
g– θ,θ
]
such that
x(t¯) +d(t¯,m(S(t¯))) >
√
g, we can proceed as in the previous case. Assume, therefore,
that x(t¯) + d(t¯,m(S(t¯))) ≤ √g for all t ∈
[
–θ,θ–2
√
g
]
∪
[
2
√
g– θ,θ
]
. Note that the
budget balance condition implies
∫ 0
–θ
(x(t) +d(t,
θ
2
))dt =
∫ θ
0
(x(t) +d(t,–
θ
2
))dt =
θ2
4
+g > θ
√
g. (12)
Thus, in particular,
∫ 2√g–θ
0
(x(t) +d(t,
θ
2
))dt >
(
2
√
g– θ
) √
g. (13)
(12) and (13) imply that
∫ 2√g–θ
–θ
(x(t) +d(t,S(t)))dt =
∫ 0
–θ
(x(t) +d(t,–
θ
2
))dt +
∫ 2√g–θ
0
(x(t) +d(t,
θ
2
))dt > 2g.
Hence, a coalition
[
–θ,2
√
g– θ
]
is prone to secession, a contradiction to the as-
sumed secession-proofness of the allocation x. 
In the proof of our next propositions we use some results from the basic
measure theory. The first two rely on the regularity of the Lebesgue measure
(Billingsley (1986), Theorem 12.3):
Claim A.4 If S is a bounded and measurable subset of ℜ then for every ε > 0
there exists a compact set Kε ⊆ S with λ(S \Kε) ≤ ε.
Claim A.5 If S is a bounded and measurable subset of ℜ then for every ε > 0
there exists an open set Oε ⊇ S with λ(Oε \S) ≤ ε.
Another is a well-known result (Billingsley (1986), page 231):
Claim A.6 Lusin’s theorem Let A be a bounded measurable subset of ℜ and
h is a measurable function on A. Then for every ε > 0 there exists a compact set
Cε ⊆A with λ(C˜ε) ≥ λ(A) –ε and h is continuous on Cε.
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Finally, we will utilize the property of essential boundedness of secession-proof
allocations in a multi-jurisdictional framework:
Claim A.7 Let N (Rθ) > 1 and x ∈ SP(θ,g). Then there exists a constant q > 0
such that x(t) ≤ q almost everywhere on Rθ, or λ ({t ∈ Rθ : x(t) > q}) = 0. In fact, q
can be chosen as any number exceeding 2
√
g.
Proof: Let N (Rθ) > 1 and x ∈ SP(θ,g). We shall show that
λ ({t ∈ Rθ : x(t)+ | t –m(S(t)) |> 2s(Rθ)}) = 0,
where s(Rθ) is the optimal size in Rθ.
Suppose, to the contrary, that λ (S) > 0, where S ≡ {t ∈ℜ : x(t)+ | t –m(S(t)) |> 2s(Rθ)}.
Let S1, S2 be two adjacent jurisdictions in an optimal partition, with λ(S
′) > 0,
where S′ = S2∩S. Denote T ≡ S1∪S′ and define the T-cost allocation y as follows:
y(t) =
{
x(t) if t ∈ S1
0 if t ∈ S′.
We have
D(T ) +g ≤
∫
T
(y(t)+ | t –m(S1) |)dt <
∫
S1
x(t)dt
∫
S
| t –m((S1) | dt.
Since | t –m(S1) |< x(t)+ | t –m(S2) | for all t ∈ S′, it follows that
D(T ) +g <
∫
T
(x(t)+ | t –m(S(t)) |)dt.
That is, T is prone to secession, contradicting our assumption that x is secession-
proof.
Proof of Proposition 5.2: Let δ > 0. By Proposition 2.2, the Rawlsian allocation
xθ
R
is “close” to
√
g and the optimal jurisdictional size is “close" to 2
√
g when θ is
large enough. Thus, we can choose θ˜ such that | xθ
R
–
√
g |< δ
4
and s(Rθ) <
5
2
√
g for
every θ > θ˜.
Let θ > θ˜. Suppose now that y ∈ SP(θ,g) and the set S ∈ Rθ with a positive
measure is granted a a privilege of magnitude δ via allocation y. Let λ(S) = ρ > 0.
We will use the following claim:
Claim A.8 There exists a finite family of pairwise disjoint intervals I˜ =
{I1, . . . , Im} such that
(i)
λ(I ) ≥ ρ
2
, where I ≡
⋃
Ii∈I˜
Ii,
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(ii) ∫
I
z(t)dt <
∫
I
(
xRθ (t)+ | t –m(S(t)) |
)
dt –
δ
2
λ(I ).
Proof: Let the number η be such that 0 < η < δ
10
√
g
. Claim A.4 implies that there
exists a compact subset K of S such that λ (K) > 34ρ and an open set Oη with Oη ⊇ S
such that
λ
(
Oη\K
)
≤ ηλ (K) . (14)
For every t ∈ K , let I (t) ⊂ Oη be an interval that contains t. Since K is compact,
the cover {I (t)}t∈K admits a subcover I = I1, . . . , IN . We may assume, without loss
of generality, that all intervals in I are pairwise disjoint, and, moreover that Oη
consists only of elements of I.
Denote by I˜ the following subset of I:
I˜ = {Ii ∈ I|λ (K
c ∩ Ii)
λ (Ii)
≤ 3η}.
By (14), we have ∑
Ii∈I
λ (Kc ∩ Ii) = λ
(
Oη\K
)
≤ ηλ (K) < 3
4
ηρ.
But ∑
Ii∈I
λ (Kc ∩ Ii) =
∑
Ii∈I˜
λ (Kc ∩ Ii) +
∑
Ii<I˜
λ (Kc ∩ Ii) > 3η
∑
Ii<I˜
λ (Ii) .
Thus,
λ(
⋃
Ii<I˜
Ii) <
1
4
λ(K), and λ(I˜ ) >
3
4
λ(K) >
ρ
2
,
where I =
⋃
Ii∈I˜ Ii. Moreover,∫
I
z(t)dt =
∫
K∩I
z(t)dt +
∫
Kc∩I
z(t)dt.
We have ∫
K∩I
z(t)dt < λ(I )(
√
g–δ),
By Claim A.7, z(t) < 5
√
g almost everywhere on Rθ, yielding∫
Kc∩I
z(t)dt ≤ 5√gηλ(I ).
Since η < δ
10
√
g
, we have ∫
I˜
z(t)dt < λ(I )(
√
g–
δ
2
),
which completes the proof of the claim. 
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Let I be a family of m intervals that satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) of Claim A.8.
Then there exists an interval I∗ ∈ I such that λ(I∗) > ρ
2m
. Let I∗ = (a,b). We have∫
I
z(t)dt <
∫
I
(xθR(t)+ | t –m(S(t)) |)dt –
δ(b–a)
2
and ∫
Rθ\I
z(t)dt >
∫
Rθ\I
(xθR(t)+ | t –m(S(t)) |)dt +
δ(b–a)
2
. (15)
Consider the coalition T = T1
⋃
T2, where T1 = [–θ,a] and T2 = [b,θ]. Assume that θ
is large enough so that λ(Tj) >
θ
2
, j = 1,2.
By assertion (ii) of Proposition 2.2, the total contribution of individuals in T1
and T2 satisfies
f (s(Tj))λ(Tj) ≤ λ(Tj)√g+
27
√
g3
λ(Tj)
≤ λ(Tj)√g+
54
√
g3
θ
for j = 1,2. Thus, the total contribution of the individuals in T , F(T ) = f (s(T1))λ(T1)+
f (s(T2))λ(T2) satisfies
F(T ) ≤ λ(T )√g+ 108
√
g3
θ
≤
∫
T
(xθR(t)+ | t –m(S(t)) |)dt +
108
√
g3
θ
.
But, by (15),∫
T
(y(t)+ | t –m(S(t)) |)dt >
∫
T
(xθR(t)+ | t –m(S(t)) |)dt +
δ(b–a)
2
.
The secession-proofness of y implies∫
T
(y(t)+ | t –m(S(t)) |)dt ≤ F(T )
and, therefore,
b–a ≤ 216
√
g3
δθ
.
The inequality b–a ≥ ρ
2m
immediately implies that
ρ ≤ 432m
√
g3
δθ
.
Since m is independent of θ, it follows that the last inequality is violated when θ is
large enough. 
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